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Abstract. The essay compares mark Johnston’s and Hilary Putnam’s approaches 
to the philosophy of religion in the framework of Charles Taylor’s claim that 
in modernity ‘intermediate positions’ between theism and naturalism become 
increasingly attractive for a  growing amount of people. both authors show 
that intermediate positions between naturalism and theism are conceptually 
plausible without having to deny that the conflicting worldviews are about 
a mind-independent reality. Johnston bridges the gap between naturalism and 
theism by developing a panentheistic worldview, Putnam denies the necessity 
of bridging it by choosing an  attitude toward the world that allows for the 
coexistence of at least partly incommensurable conceptualizations of what there 
is. In both cases the conceptual exploration of intermediate positions is fed by 
the authors’ commitment to intellectual integrity in coming to terms with the 
tension between scientific explanation and religious interpretation in the age of 
applied sciences.
There is an  obvious tension that has always qualified the relationship 
between natural explanation and religious interpretation of the world. 
The allegorical interpretation of authoritative religious scripture in the 
Jewish and Christian tradition, going back as far as Philo and origines, 
has been at least partly motivated by this tension. Since the 1800s, in the 
wake of Darwinism, historicism and the rise of empirical psychology, this 
tension is no longer a purely academic affair. It has deeply influenced the 
practical dispositions of a still growing majority of people. even more so, 
it is the ubiquity of applied science in an increasingly technology-laden 
lifeworld that fosters this tension nowadays. The engineering force of 
technology reaches into the structure of life. If its organic constituents 
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can be intentionally changed, it seems to be evident for many that they 
are also the essence of life. And the expanding scientific accessibility of 
the organic realm has consequences in habitus formation.
Two examples: Firstly, within the last 20 years the diagnosis of some 
sort of mental disorder has risen by over 30% in the Western world. 
The renowned psychiatrist Allen Frances has pointed out that the new 
Diagnostic and Statistical manual of mental Disorders, published 
in may 2013 (DSm-5) will cause a  diagnostic inflation in psychiatry 
by reducing thresholds for existing disorders and introducing new 
disorders at the fuzzy boundaries to normality.1 Secondly, there is 
a  growing market for braincare practices that promise to delay aging 
and prolong mental fitness. The prudential good of old age has been 
reformulated as a proper organic state that is under scientific control. 
In both cases, scientific explanation takes precedence over a change in 
the way of seeing one’s own life. Comprehensive interpretations of life as 
they have been offered by religions seem to be dispensable in the light of 
a growing control over nature.
I suggest that under contemporary conditions in the West we should 
focus the tension between natural explanation and religious interpretation 
as ‘cross-pressures’ – to use Charles Taylor’s term – between naturalism 
and theism. ‘The great invention of the West’, according to Taylor, is the 
establishment of ‘an  immanent order in Nature, whose working could 
be systematically understood and explained on its own terms, leaving 
open the question whether this whole order had a deeper significance, 
and whether, if it did, we should infer a transcendent Creator beyond it. 
This notion of the “immanent” involved denying – or at least isolating 
and problematizing – any form of interpenetration between the things of 
Nature, on the one hand, and the “supernatural” on the other.’2 leaving 
open the question whether we should infer a  transcendent Creator 
beyond the immanent order in Nature is, again, no academic question, 
but depends on the potential of the immanent order to do the whole job. 
The immanent order allows us to build hospitals, but does it get rid of 
sickness? It delivers the tools of prolonging one’s life, but does it defeat 
mortality? It may increase material wealth, but does it secure happiness? 
1 Allen Frances, Saving Normal: An Insider’s Revolt against Out-of-Control Psychiatric 
Diagnosis, DSM-5, Big Pharma, and the Medicalization of Ordinary Life (New York: 
HarperCollins Publishers, 2013).
2 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Havard univ. Press, 2007), p. 16.
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Taylor senses cross pressures in our culture ‘between the draw of the 
narratives of closed immanence on the one hand, and the sense of their 
inadequacy on the other’3 – the latter has obviously to do with the fact 
that the answers to the foregoing questions are negative. The Western 
population is torn between an  anti-religious and particularly anti-
Christian sentiment that is based on the expanding knowledge gathered 
in the sciences and humanities on the one hand and an aversion toward 
some extreme form of reduction initiated by this very knowledge 
on the other. This reduction takes the ‘nothing but’ form: Sickness is 
nothing but a problem of proper medication; mortality will be rendered 
irrelevant by significantly extending our lifespan; consent on the vague 
topic of happiness can only be found in terms of the accessibility to 
material wealth.
but even those who sense the inadequacy of the immanent order are 
confronted with the cognitive problem of interrelating the immanent 
and the transcendent. Taylor’s diagnosis is that late modernity unfolds 
a  broad spectrum of ‘intermediate positions’ between naturalism and 
theism that tries to go beyond the ‘nothing but’-stance toward the world, 
but at the same time does not fail to acknowledge that the immanent 
order is potentially coherent on its own terms. Therefore the intermediate 
positions don’t go for any ‘God of the gaps’ like, for example, in certain 
theological interpretations of quantum mechanics. obviously, the 
attempt of interrelating the immanent and the transcendent on these 
premises boils down to how we can conceptualize what is supposed to be 
real. The tension between naturalism and theism has an intrinsic drive 
to articulate itself within the dichotomy of realism vs. anti-realism. This 
dichotomy should be considered as indicating the striving for intellectual 
integrity in dealing with the cross pressures between naturalism and 
theism. In the following I will present two intermediate positions that 
both explicitly refer to intellectual integrity or honesty as the driving 
force of coming to terms with the aforesaid cross pressures in modern 
life. And both positions take, as I  would say, intermediate positions 
between straightforward realism and anti-realism. These positions 
have been recently and prominently articulated by mark Johnston in 
his contribution to philosophical theology under the title Saving God 
from 2009 and by Hilary Putnam in his reflections on the philosophy of 
religion since Renewing Philosophy and especially in Jewish Philosophy 
3 Ibid., p. 595.
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as a Guide to Life, published in 2008. before I suggest how Johnston and 
Putnam are to be located between realism and anti-realism, I intend to 
give a rough definition of the key terms I will be using.
The ‘quest for reality’ has a metaphysical and an epistemological side 
to it. I suggest calling metaphysically real that which is independent of 
what we think about it, and epistemically real what humans get to know 
in itself, in its mind-independent reality.4 Accordingly, metaphysical anti-
realism supposes that we cannot think of anything real as independent 
of our mind, whereas epistemic anti-realism rejects the possibility of 
knowing things in themselves. Various positions may be differentiated 
according to the relation of the metaphysical and the epistemic claim. It 
is possible to claim independence plus accessibility of certain entities, but 
also to combine the independence claim with the denial of accessibility 
to the supposedly independent. Whereas epistemic antirealism seems to 
follow necessarily from metaphysical antirealism, metaphysical realism 
does not force us to take the position of epistemic realism. We may think 
of a completely mind-independent world without expecting that we will 
ever come to a complete or even nearly complete conceptual account of 
this world. let us see now, how naturalism and theism fit into the picture 
of the major dichotomy.
If we follow Arthur C. Danto’s definition in The Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy, naturalism ‘is a  species of philosophical monism 
according to which whatever exists or happens is natural in the sense 
of being susceptible to explanation through methods, which, although 
paradigmatically exemplified in the natural sciences, are continuous 
from domain to domain of objects and events. Hence, naturalism is 
polemically defined as repudiating the view that there exists or could 
exist any entities or events which lie, in principle, beyond the scope of 
scientific explanation’.5 I would rather refer to this position as scientism. 
It combines metaphysical realism with epistemic realism on the basis of 
scientific explanation. other versions of naturalism would accordingly 
take science to deliver pragmatically successful explanations of the 
natural realm, explanations that might nonetheless radically change 
in the wake of scientific revolutions and their cultural embeddings. 
4 I  follow merold Westphal with this differentiation. Cf. merold Westphal, 
‘Theological Anti-realism’, in Andrew moore & michael Scott (eds.), Realism and 
Religion. Philosophical and Theological Perspectives (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), p. 132.
5 Arthur C. Danto, ‘Naturalism’, in: The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: 
macmillan Publishers,1967).
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These versions would combine epistemic anti-realism either with 
metaphysical realism or metaphysical anti-realism. In the first case they 
would take the conceptual account of the natural realm as an ongoing 
process of approximation to theoretical coherence and consistency, 
which nevertheless might fail to grasp what the world is in itself. In the 
second case they would take the conceptualizations of the world as being 
somehow constitutive of what they intend to grasp.
How about theism? A metaphysically realist version of theism would 
contend that God has a  mind-independent reality. epistemic realism 
would additionally claim that this reality is subject to human knowledge, 
whether via reason or revelation. It is obvious that this position is at 
loggerheads with religious pluralism, since there can be only one veridical 
access to the mind-independent reality of God and accordingly the other 
ones must be false  – unless they are taken to be different versions of 
the supposedly right access which can be correctly reformulated in the 
appropriate vocabulary. metaphysically anti-realist conceptions of God 
take whatever his name refers to as being dependent on the cognitive 
faculties, desires and dispositions of man. one way to be metaphysically 
anti-realist about God would be to call him an imaginative construct.6 The 
supposed construct, again, calls for functional explanation. This position 
is compatible with a religion-critical as well as religion-affirmative stance. 
Justin barrett, for example, a cognitive scientist at oxford, claims that 
humans are ‘naturally endowed with cognitive faculties that stimulate 
belief in the divine’,7 including a  hyperactive agent detection device. 
Whereas for richard Dawkins this research feeds into his Darwinian 
account of religious belief that he takes to undermine its epistemic value, 
barrett himself accepts it as evidence that can justify religious claims.8 
metaphysical realism about naturalism can very well coexist with 
metaphysical antirealism about theism, both, for unbelievers or even 
atheists as well as for believers.
6 Cf. Gordon D. Kaufman, ‘mystery, God, and Constructivism’, in Andrew moore & 
michael Scott, op. cit., p. 16.
7 Kelly James Clark and Justin l. barrett, ‘reidian religious epistemology and the 
Cognitive Science of religion’, Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 79 (2011), 
pp. 639 – 675.
8 The indication of this debate I owe to Wayne Proudfoot’s ‘Pragmatism and Naturalism 
in the Study of religion’, in Hermann Deuser, Hans Joas, matthias Jung, magnus Schlette 
(eds.), The Varieties of Transcendence: Pragmatism and the Theory of Religion (New York: 
Fordham univ. Press, forthcoming).
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If we want to understand the cross pressures in our culture between 
realism and anti-realism about the worldviews of naturalism and theism 
we must understand how they contribute to the best account of our 
self-understanding. Consequently they must be viewed from the first-
person perspective. What speaks for realism in religious matters from 
the first-person-perspective is the fact that certain experiences we call 
religious are experiences about God, his action, presence and so forth. 
even if those experiences might not be specific enough for a warrant of 
apprehension, believers are certain that they have encountered God and 
not, for example, his imaginative construct, which, by the way, cannot 
be the subject of an  encounter for grammatical reasons: Nothing we 
just imagine can surprise or irritate us, and an encounter always bears 
the potential of an irritation or surprise. What that means in religious 
matters we may learn from the phenomenological precision of scholars 
in religious studies such as William James or rudolf otto. on the other 
hand, what speaks for anti-realism in religious matters is the fact that 
a realist interpretation of religious experience contradicts the suggestive 
force of our third-person-knowledge. let me give you an example:9 the 
Swiss ethno-psychoanalyst Paul Parin once travelled to a  melanesian 
tribe and got to talk to members of this tribe. At some point he asked 
a  young man how he contracted the suppuration of his right big toe. 
The man answered that his mother in law had bewitched him. A little 
later Parin noticed that the man’s left big toe did not look much better. 
The man informed him that he got an  infection there. Noticing that 
Parin was puzzled about his answer the man asked, whether he, Parin, 
did not know what an  infection is. I bet we would have been puzzled 
too. We tend to think that whenever the story of infection is available to 
appropriately clarify a particular matter like a swollen foot, the story of 
witchcraft has lost its validity. There seems to be an expansive force in 
the naturalist worldview which invites the belief that, in the long run, 
it will be applicable to fields which so far have not been affected by it. 
Whenever a particular matter comes into the spotlight of the infection 
paradigm, it seems to force some sort of inferential scorekeeping on us 
that does not allow for the witchcraft paradigm anymore. What speaks 
for realism about naturalism, therefore, is the eminent success of science 
9 I owe this example to Hans Julius Schneider, ‘Spirituelle Praxis, religiöse rede und 
intellektuelle redlichkeit’, in Gerald Hartung & magnus Schlette (eds.), Religiosität und 
intellektuelle Redlichkeit (Tübingen: mohr Siebeck, 2012).
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in establishing an  order we may live by, an  order with an  enormous 
potential to manipulate and predict states and events. What speaks 
for an  anti-realist stance about naturalism is the realm of experiences 
that science cannot account for, yet, unless it agrees to some form of 
descriptive reductionism.
As I already mentioned, a position mediating between realism and 
anti-realism could uphold that what there is, is independent of our 
minds, whereas our cognition of it does not just mirror it in itself but 
is contentually dependent on our conceptual activity. I  now want to 
suggest that mark Johnston  – in Saving God from 2009  – and Hilary 
Putnam – in his later works on the philosophy of religion up to Jewish 
Philosophy as a Guide to Life from 2008 – offer two versions of how to 
take such an intermediate position in dealing with the tension between 
naturalism and theism. I will give a sketch of how they both digest the 
cross pressures of naturalism and theism, and then shortly comment on 
how their positions fit into the picture of the realism debate.
let’s start with Johnston’s praise of naturalism. He understands 
‘legitimate naturalism’ as ‘proper respect for the methods and 
achievements of science’,10 which means that theism receives its epistemic 
value from its coherence with the verification-related knowledge that 
has been acquired in the sciences. The achievements of science are 
treated as a benchmark for the credibility of religious convictions. on 
the other hand, Johnston defends these against scientism, proposed by 
‘undergraduate atheists’ – as Johnston stresses the supposed simplicity of 
their worldview – according to which science ‘will provide an exhaustive 
inventory of what there is’.11 Johnston illustrates his route between 
a  concept of theism that is indifferent to the achievements of science 
and a reductionist account of theism fuelled by scientism with a simple 
example: ‘No one should think that an  ordinary description of the 
neighbor’s wedding and a mathematical description of the trajectories 
of the fundamental particles involved in the events of the wedding are 
descriptions of the very same activity, namely, the wedding. The physical 
events subsumed under the basic physical laws are thus better seen as 
the ultimate material constituents of the activities, achievements, and 
accomplishments whose forms physics has no business rehearsing.’12 
10 mark Johnston, Saving God (Princeton: Princeton university Press, 2009), p. 43.
11 Ibid., p. 47.
12 Ibid., p. 49.
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Accordingly Johnston suggests reflecting on the meaning of what there 
is according to theism in the light of the premise that it must consist 
of ultimate material constituents, which may be identified by science. 
‘legitimate naturalism is not the thesis that only the natural realm exists. 
That is the thesis of scientism. legitimate naturalism is the view that 
the domain of the natural sciences is complete on its own terms: every 
causal transaction ultimately consists of some utterly natural process, for 
example, mass-energy transfer. There are no gods of the gaps.’13
The first step of this approach is the rigid refusal of supernatural 
elements and interpretations in the Christian tradition, which Johnston 
almost exclusively focuses on in his treatment of theism. Consequently, 
he understands ‘God’ not as a  proper name, which according to his 
Kripke-style argumentation would have to be connected ‘with a chain of 
reference that leads back to an original use of the name in question, a use 
in which the name was given to its bearer’.14 The logic of his argumentation 
requires understanding ‘god’ as a descriptive name, since ‘[t]here is no 
original dubbing of someone or something as “God”’.15 Whereas proper 
names have a  rigid reference, but flexible meaning, descriptive names 
to the contrary combine a  flexible reference with rigid meanings: ‘the 
reference of such names is just that of their semantically associated 
descriptions.’16 In accordance with the monotheistic tradition he then 
specifies the content of this name as the ‘Highest one from whom our 
salvation flows. For that is the common conception of God in the major 
monotheisms’.17 beware, now, that according to Johnston, the matrix 
of what there is consists of its ultimate material constituents. Hence 
his concept of God’s existence, of his power and impact on the earthly 
matters has to match this naturalist premise, too. Johnston’s solution 
that leans against an  interpretation of the tetragrammaton, including 
a critical debate of traditional philosophical theology on this matter, is 
the conceptualization of god as ‘the outpouring of existence Itself by way 
of its exemplification in ordinary existents’.18
Johnston then connects this ontological concept of God with 
an epistemological concept of religious experience as a  form of direct 
13 Ibid., p. 127.
14 Ibid., p. 5.
15 Ibid., p. 6.
16 Ibid., p. 7.
17 Ibid., p. 13.
18 Ibid., p. 113.
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realism that allows access to the self-disclosure of the Highest one in 
ordinary existents on condition of a  revised way of seeing as well as 
a  fundamentally changed attitude toward life. Here Johnston clearly 
borrows from Wittgenstein’s lectures on ethics: ‘In the experience of 
feeling absolutely safe, everything in one’s sensory field is presented 
as a  manifestation of something that remains the same despite its 
various transformations into things that come into being and pass 
away. moreover, on the side of introspection or inner perception, one is 
given to oneself as just another such manifestation, one whose passing 
away will leave intact everything that is fundamentally precious. It is, 
if you like, an experience of ordinary existents as dependent aspects of 
something else, as modes or modifications of that something else, which 
itself always remains.’19 The point is that epistemology and ontology are 
intrinsically related: the self-disclosure of the Highest one ontologically 
encompasses its cognition, the cognition of the Highest one finds itself 
as being epistemically dependent on the self-disclosure of the Highest 
one. Johnston calls this ‘presentationalism’ in explicit opposition to the 
dogma of representationalism.20
but the accessibility of the Highest one calls for the virtue of self-
decentration, which Johnston takes to be at the core of the Gospel 
and the essence of grace and redemption. The large-scale defects of 
human life, personal suffering and individual striving for the sunny 
side of the street that intends to circumvent or at least buffer existential 
contingencies, are rendered irrelevant, the worldliness of self-love and 
righteousness are overcome. The believer devotes himself to the Highest 
one who provides salvation by disclosing himself in this very devotion 
that provides cognitive access to it. Johnston calls it agape, and Jesus 
Christ becomes his key symbol for this virtue: ‘Christ conquers death 
on our behalf by ideally exemplifying agape, and stimulating it in us.’21 
The image of Jesus Christ that Johnston evokes in Saving God is similar 
to Nietzsche’s intimate portrait of Jesus as the ‘berg-, See – und Wiesen-
Prediger, dessen erscheinung wie ein buddha auf einem sehr wenig 
indischen boden anmutet’.22 Johnston presents Jesus as the antetype of 
a panentheistic spirituality that enlivens the best of Christian theism.
19 Ibid., p. 111.
20 Cf. ibid., p. 143.
21 Ibid., p. 186.
22 Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘Antichrist’, Götzendämmerung (Stuttgart: Kröner,1990), p. 227.
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let’s turn to Putnam, who embraces naturalism not less than Johnston 
does. In the autobiographical introduction to his Jewish Philosophy as 
a Guide to Life from 2008, he described his standpoint between naturalism 
and theism as ‘somewhere between John Dewey in A Common Faith and 
martin buber’.23 Dewey stands for a  religiously open naturalism that 
has also been referred to as religious naturalism.24 Dewey insistently 
defended and actually personally demonstrated that it is possible to 
integrate strong naturalist convictions and a  deeply religious attitude 
toward the world. Dewey acknowledges what Taylor now calls the 
experience of fullness at the heart of authentic religiousness. He stresses 
that nobody need fear that she lose access to this deeper dimension of 
life if she revokes her commitment to the supernaturalist contents of 
traditional religion. And he also says that nobody seeking this deeper 
dimension of life is necessarily forced into supernaturalist convictions. 
Dewey accounts for this promise by centring religiousness in religious 
experience and by conceptualizing religious experience in a  merely 
formal way, according to which ‘“religious” as a  quality of experience 
signifies something that may belong to all [...] experiences’25 – whether 
they are aesthetic, scientific, moral or political. He wants to mobilize 
religious experience as an innerworldy force that may be present in all 
we do and that may shape our accomplishments.26 It is the force of ‘being 
conquered, vanquished, in our active nature by an ideal end; it signifies 
acknowledgement of its rightful claim over our desires and purposes’27 
that unifies the self and evokes a feeling of harmony with the universe.28 
Dewey calls faith the unification of the self ‘through allegiance to 
inclusive ideal ends, which imagination presents to us and to which the 
human will respond as worthy of controlling our desires and choices’.29 
Please note that the intentional object of faith is an ideal that as such has 
neither a mere subjective reality ‘in mind’ nor a substantive reality within 
some remote ontological sphere, but an operative reality ‘in character, in 
personality and action’.30
23 Hilary Putnam, Jewish Philosophy as a  Guide to Life (bloomington: Indiana 
university Press, 2008), p. 5.
24 Cf. J. A. Stone, Religious Naturalism Today. The Rebirth of a Forgotten Alternative 
(Albany: State university of New York Press, 2007).
25 John Dewey, A Common Faith (New Haven: Yale university Press, 1934), p. 10.
26 Ibid., p. 14.
27 Ibid., p. 20.
28 Ibid., pp. 22f.
29 Ibid., p. 33.
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Supernaturalist beliefs do not fit into this picture. They are wrong, 
since naturalism has an astonishing career of verification behind it and 
in front of it, which steadily diminishes the sphere of supernaturalist 
propositions held to be true.31 besides that, supernaturalist beliefs 
‘weaken and sap the force of the possibilities’32 inherent in the common 
and natural relations of mankind. Now, Dewey does not only rebuff 
supernaturalism, he also identifies the traditional institutionalized 
religions with supernaturalism. Again, he does not plea for giving up the 
idea of ‘God’ but for avoiding ‘misleading conceptions’ of what this idea 
‘really’ refers to: ‘For there are forces in nature and society that generate 
and support the ideals. They are further unified by the action that gives 
them coherence and solidity. It is this active relationship between ideal 
and actual to which I would give the name “God”.’33
Putnam proceeds on his way to reconcile the naturalist and the theistic 
outlook by accepting Dewey’s general naturalist and religious premises, 
but declining the conclusions he draws from them: Supernaturalism is 
wrong, ‘the kind of reality God has is the reality of an ideal’,34 an ideal 
as objective as it can be in that it calls forth deeds of great courage and 
dedication. on the other hand, God is not just an ideal like any other. ‘The 
traditional believer’, says Putnam, ‘– and this is something I share with the 
traditional believer [...] – visualizes God as a supremely wise, kind, just 
person.’35 Indeed, this believer may ask whether Dewey defends a rather 
distortingly deflated concept of religious experience which leaves out 
what is essential to it, namely that it is intrinsically related to a supremely 
wise, kind, just person as its internal object.36 The argument is not that 
any religious experience worthy of its name has to be the experience of 
a  personal God. The argument is that particular religious experiences 
cannot be reformulated in non-theistic terms without avoiding  – in 
Wayne Proudfoot’s terms  – descriptive reductionism.37 Accordingly, 
30 Ibid., p. 48.
31 Ibid., p. 30.
32 Ibid., p. 27.
33Ibid., p. 51.
34 Ibid., p. 101.
35 Ibid., p. 102.
36 For this argument cf. richard bernstein, ‘Pragmatism’s Common Faith’, in Stuart 
rosenbaum (ed.), Pragmatism and Religion (Chicago: university of Illinois Press, 2003), 
p. 135.
37 Cf. Wayne Proudfoot, Religious Experience (berkeley: university of California Pr., 
1985).
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Putnam also refutes Dewey’s suggestion that by defending theism you 
feed into the pockets of supernaturalism. For Putnam, naturalist theism 
is possible. You may decline supernaturalism and still deeply believe in 
God as a person who is supremely wise and, above all, kind and just to 
you. How can that be?
I  think that Putnam wants to reconcile Dewey-style religious 
naturalism with theism by turning to the philosophy of Wittgenstein. For 
Putnam, Wittgenstein’s laconic linguistic observations on the religious 
use of language hint to how a reconciliation of naturalism and theism 
might be possible, a reconciliation that takes both to be cognitively valid 
outlooks on the world. let me concentrate on five brief points in his 
interpretation of Wittgenstein:
(1) The meaning of a linguistic expression depends on the inferential 
commitments we have when using this expression. This becomes clear if 
we take a look at the analogy Wittgenstein draws between an algorithm 
on the one hand and the inferential commitments we enter into by using 
the vocabulary of our language on the other. If somebody said that 2 plus 
21 was 13, it would be inappropriate to accuse him of making a mistake; 
the difference to our way of adding numbers would be just too big. This 
brings us to the next point:
(2) There are different semantic frameworks that qualify what we are 
inferentially committed to, when we use the vocabulary of our ordinary 
language. Wittgenstein makes it clear ‘that religious people do employ 
pictures, and that they draw certain consequences from them, but not 
the same consequences that we draw when we use similar pictures in 
other contexts. If I speak of my friend as having an eye, then normally 
I am prepared to say that he has an eyebrow, but when I speak of the eye 
of God being upon me, I am not prepared to speak of the eyebrow of 
God’.38 but it may be objected that these different contexts of use simply 
hint to the difference between literal and metaphorical meaning, which 
brings us to the third point:
(3) The semantic frameworks in question cannot be reduced to 
each other. In consequence this means that the differentiation between 
literal and metaphorical meaning can only be appropriately drawn from 
a  standpoint within each framework. And whether something can be 
said in a non-pictorial manner can only be decided inside the semantic 
38 Hilary Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard university Press, 1992), 
p. 156.
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framework in question. Here Putnam agrees with Wittgenstein, who 
says there may be pictures ‘at the root of all our thinking’,39 which must 
therefore be respected. Criteria for applying a picture, which are external 
to the semantic framework in which the picture is used, including 
criteria to translate a picture into a certain literal meaning, may entirely 
distort what the speaker intended to say. They may force inferential 
commitments upon him, which are completely foreign to his outlook on 
life. This point, in short, boils down to the claim that there are outlooks 
on life that are relatively incommensurable, as Putnam says. but we have 
to consider what this means in the light of the fourth point:
(4) No outlook on life is absolutely incommensurable with another 
because they all, although differently, refer to one world. As Putnam 
puts it in ‘The Question of realism’: ‘[...] we can think of our words and 
thoughts as having determinate reference to objects (when it is clear what 
sort of “objects” we are talking about and what vocabulary we are using); 
but there is no one fixed sense of “reference” involved. Accepting the 
ubiquity of conceptual relativity does not require us to deny that truth 
genuinely depends on the behaviour of things distant from the speaker, 
but the nature of the dependence changes as the kinds of language games 
we invent change.’40 This statement, again, has to be seen in the context 
of the fifth point:
(5) Semantic frameworks of the aforesaid non-reductive kind have 
the ‘human weight’ – as Wittgenstein formulates it – of being intrinsically 
embedded in a form of life and therefore expressing practical differences 
they make in the exchange between the individual and his environment. 
Putnam interprets Wittgenstein’s remark that we can only know whether 
a believer is using a particular picture by the consequences he does or 
does not draw including inferential semantic commitments as much as 
practical commitments.
let us return to Putnam’s statement that God, in being visualized ‘as 
a supremely wise, kind, just person’, is ‘not an ideal of the same kind as 
equality or Justice’. In the light of his understanding and adaptation of 
Wittgenstein, he makes the point that the meaning of the word ‘God’ 
as much as its reference is entirely internal to the particular religious 
39 ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, ed. G. Hendrik v. Wright (oxford: basil 
blackwell, 1998), p.  83. Cf. Hilary Putnam, ‘Does Disquotational Theory Solve All 
Problems’, in Hilary Putnam, Words and Life (Cambridge, mass.: Harvard university 
Press, 1995), p. 277.
40 Hilary Putnam, ‘The Question of realism’, in Hilary Putnam, Words and Life, p. 309.
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life form which is substantiated and individualized by the texts, rituals 
and practices of the according religion. The reality of this religion, so to 
speak, is the life form that entails semantic and practical commitments, 
which decide what it means to get it right or wrong to be in connection 
with God. Any claim that the belief in ‘God’ as a supremely wise, kind, 
just person (including all inferential commitments implied in calling 
him wise, just and kind) cannot be meant literally because literally 
persons have intentional mental states, which are physically embodied 
and located in space and time, sums up to unfair play. The reason is that 
claims of this kind mean controlling the believer’s understanding of what 
it is for the picture to have an  application by an  antecedently filled-in 
version of that very picture, a version that is external to the inferential 
and consequential commitments of leading the life of a believer.
Putnam’s adaptation of Wittgenstein bridges the gap between his 
critical affirmation of Dewey’s A  Common Faith and his standpoint 
toward martin buber’s I  and Thou, which became one of the later 
Putnam’s focal points in dealing with Jewish philosophy as a guide to 
life. In buber’s Ich und Du Putnam finds the best of what fascinated him 
in Dewey‘s and Wittgenstein’s thoughts on religion. He finds the trust 
in enlivening the objective world with the spirit of our ideal strivings – 
buber’s dictum that the spirit of encountering the world faithfully ‘can 
permeate the It-world and change it’, even transfigure the objective world 
‘to the point where it confronts and represents the you’, resulting in 
a ‘Weltleben der Verbundenheit’, would not have failed either to impress 
Dewey or Wittgenstein;41 moreover the denial that theorizing about God 
brings us any nearer to an understanding of what it means to address 
him. Furthermore the conviction that cognizing God is not a question 
of clarifying assertability conditions of propositions in which God is 
held to exist or to do certain things, but rather of encouraging oneself 
to a  leap of faith expressed in addressing him; finally that addressing 
God is an I-Thou-relation not reducible to some sort of an objectifying 
I-It-relation we have established in subduing the world to our rational 
control. Whether God is a person, does according to buber not depend 
on whether the believer can describe what sort of person God is, but on 
whether he finds the right tone for addressing him.42 
41 martin buber, Ich und Du (Heidelberg: lambert Schneider Verlag, 1962), p. 146. Cf. 
Hilary Putnam, ‘What I and Thou is really saying’, in Hilary Putnam, Jewish Philosophy, 
p. 63.
42 Cf. Hilary Putnam, ‘What I and Thou is really saying’, p. 66.
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How do Johnston and Putnam fit into the picture of the realism-
debate? both take science to generate successful conceptualizations of 
a mind-independent reality. Nevertheless both also deny the possibility 
of getting to know things in themselves. In different ways both take the 
real to transcend our modes of access to it.
Whereas for Johnston our cognitive access to reality is part of the 
very process through which the real comes into being, Putnam accepts 
the intrinsic self-limitation of our conceptual faculties, which cannot be 
bypassed. This difference is deeply related to the way each of them thinks 
about theism. Johnston’s naturalism is religiously charged, Putnam’s isn’t. 
Johnston synthesizes naturalism and theism in a form of panentheism, 
whereas Putnam keeps them apart. According to Johnston religion 
somehow deepens the naturalist outlook on life, according to Putnam 
it takes an alternative conceptual approach. To that effect, for Johnston 
the pictorial dimension of religiously used language is a source of error 
and misunderstanding (in as far as it contradicts the naturalist account 
of the world), for Putnam it is flesh to the bone. Johnston is forced 
to comb through the scripture and sort out what does not fit into the 
naturalist view; Putnam is exposed to the limits of context-dependent 
understandability.
Where does Johnston’s naturalistic account of religion leave us 
on Taylor’s ‘intermediate positions’ between traditional theism and 
modern naturalism as competing worldviews in a secular age? Johnston 
explicitly addresses young and intelligent readers who refuse to build 
their individual view of life on ‘less than convincing authority’. This 
reader is invited to prove himself – and for himself – which ones of the 
biblical texts speak the language of ‘spiritual materialism’ and which 
ones express authentic belief. ‘The spiritual materialist is unauthentic in 
his engagement with religion [...], precisely because he simply turns his 
ordinary unredeemed desires toward some supposedly spiritual realm.’43 
much of the description of the Highest one in the three monotheisms ‘is 
at best metaphor, allegory, a series of honorific titles, or a web of analogy’.44 
Since the biblical books were written by humans, they are exposed to 
their weaknesses from vanity over envy, envy-driven ambition, fear, 
resentment and superstition. This explains the many faces of idolatry, 
which the reader faces in the bible and in the theological tradition of 
43Ibid., p. 16.
44 Johnston, op. cit., p. 99.
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its interpretation. Idolatry, Johnston says, is based on intentions to take 
partial representations of God as his authentic embodiments; it consists 
of ignorance toward the demands of devotional self-decentration; it 
contains the invention of subjectively beneficiary Hinterwelten and 
an afterlife in them; it means the domestification of religious experience 
in favour of egocentric motives: ‘Instead of God’s appearing as the wholly 
other, the numinous one who transcends anything that we can master 
by way of our own efforts, he appears as a potential patron, a powerful 
ally whom we might win over to our side.’45 Idolatrous projections of 
the ‘insecurities associated with the patriarchal psychological structure 
of ancient Near eastern tribal life’46 range from episodic narratives like 
Christ’s Ascension from the mount of olives47 to grand biblical narrations 
like the Apocalypse – which Johnston takes to derive from revengeful 
prejudices against non-believers. Authentic belief, to the contrary, ‘is 
an orientation in which the Highest one comes into view, with salvific 
effect’.48 In sum: The intermediate position Johnston proposes results in 
radical individualism that denies the authority of canonical text corpora 
as well as religious communities, which are based on tradition: one 
might paraphrase Johnston’s position  – using Grace Davies’ pertinent 
formulation in a rather different sense – as believing without belonging.
Putnam fits quit differently into Taylor’s range of intermediate 
positions. With reference to buber’s Zwei Glaubensweisen we may 
conclude that Putnam defends a  form of belonging without believing, 
‘believing’ meant in terms of acknowledging supposed facts as opposed 
to trusting somebody even without sound reasons that might legitimate 
this trust. According to buber, faith in this second mode of trust is 
something man discovers as belonging to a community, whereas faith 
in the other mode is something that qualifies the believer in his solitude, 
whose community with others is not already there but being constituted 
as an  alliance of those who have converted to the acknowledgement 
of supposed facts.49 Putnam’s approach is ‘communitarian’ in stressing 
a commonly shared praxis of articulating religious worldviews in their 
own language. This also seems to be the upshot of how Putnam has 
45 Ibid., p. 23.
46 Ibid., p. 63.
47 Ibid., p. 45.
48 Ibid.
49 m. buber, Zwei Glaubensweisen (Heidelberg: lambert Schneider Verlag, 1994), 
pp. 11ff.
35beTWeeN NATurAlISm AND THeISm
come to terms with his own religious commitment. In 1975 the older 
of Putnam’s two sons announced that he wanted to have a bar mitzvah. 
Putnam, not belonging to a minyan, had nevertheless become acquainted 
with the rabbi of one of the Jewish congregations around Harvard. ‘So 
when I had to find a place for my son to have his bar mitzvah, I found 
it natural to go and talk to rabbi Gold about the possibility of Samuel 
having the ceremony in the Worship and Study congregation. We agreed 
that my wife and I would come to services with Samuel for a year, and that 
he would study with a Jewish student [...] to prepare for the ceremony. 
long before the year was over, the Jewish service and Jewish prayers had 
become an essential part of our lives, and rabbi Gold continues to be our 
teacher and friend to this day.’50 
To sum up the result of my comparison between Putnam and 
Johnston: both authors show that intermediate positions between 
naturalism and theism are conceptually plausible without having to deny 
that the conflicting worldviews are about a  mind-independent reality. 
Johnston bridges the gap between naturalism and theism by developing 
a panentheistic worldview, Putnam denies the necessity of bridging it by 
choosing an attitude toward the world that allows for the coexistence of 
at least partly incommensurable conceptualizations of what there is. In 
both cases the conceptual exploration of intermediate positions is fed by 
the authors’ commitment to intellectual integrity in coming to terms with 
the tension between scientific explanation and religious interpretation in 
the age of applied sciences.
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